

CONSTANTINE BROWN

Contradictions About the Congo

**Kivu Cannibalism Quickly Forgotten;
Aren't U. N. Troops Mercenaries Too?**

STATINTL

ROME.—There's an old saying that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. But as the history of Katanga and the Congo is written in battle blood and high-powered politics, it seems this axiom is not necessarily true.

The contradictions are many and incredible. There was only superficial criticism of the Kivu Congolese whose barbaric and cannibalistic treatment of the whites returned this century to the times of the aborigines. But the Katangans, who work and fight side by side with whites, are described as bad people. Likewise, while the white officers who help the Katangan army fight for Katanga's rights are called mercenaries, the United Nations forces are described as the forces of law and order. Why aren't these Irish, Swedish, Indian and Ethiopian forces mercenaries? They volunteered and receive substantial extra pay from the U. N. to fight a war for a cause that doesn't interest them except for financial advantages.

The foreigners fighting with the Katanga troops have not received pay for months, yet they fight on. Some have said in interviews that though they began as mercenaries, they now have adopted the cause of the Tshombe government.

The Katanga war was an ugly war and its repercussions will be felt for a long time. Among other things it has shaken the confidence of our principal allies in both the United States and the United Nations. Peoples everywhere had believed that the U. N. Charter contained provisions to permit self-determination. The organization lost face when it did nothing to help the Hungarians in their tragic attempt at freedom in 1956. But today the U. N. has actually made war on people who wanted their autonomy.

The Europeans have little

confidence in the U. N. But what about America, the great nation with a big heart and plenty of punch, which has always championed the cause of the weak? Ask our European friends. What has become of this tradition—what has become of the Four Freedoms proclaimed by Franklin Roosevelt? Have they been junked for the sake of the policies of the U. N. secretariat?

This brings another contradiction in the minds of our allies. From the various statements emanating from the U. N. as well as explanations of this policy from Washington, the reason for the determination to bring Katanga into the Congo confederation by force is that the U. N. cannot afford defeat—it must have victory for its prestige. The contradiction comes from the fact that the United States has sided with this determination for victory originating from the officers in command of the U. N. forces. In the last few years our policy has been based on the theory that, in this nuclear age, war is so unthinkable that we must adjust ourselves to something between victory and surrender.

This policy of neither victory nor surrender was spelled out in a book written for the United States Air Force in 1956 by Paul Keoskemeth for the Rand Corp. The new United States policy can be summed up in one short sentence from that book: "One may safely say that the maxim: 'In war there is no substitute for victory' is totally erroneous."

From the policies followed by the United States in the last 10 years it is evident that a basis for negotiations has taken the place of victory over communism. But not so the United Nations. Hence eyebrows are raised in wonderment not only in Paris and Brussels, but also in London.

It is ironic that fate should have punctured the beginning of the campaign to make the image of Katanga's leader, Moise Tshombe, into a barbaric savage. After a long investigation by the U. N. it was announced in press releases that Tshombe actually had witnessed the lynching of the pro-Communist Congo leader Patrice Lumumba. But the following day this assertion fell into oblivion when some Kivu "soldiers" seized and murdered 13 unarmed Italian Air men on a peaceful U. N. mission and, among other things, sold their dismembered bodies in the meat market. A few formal statements of horror were all that came from official quarters. No punishment for the Kivu cannibals belonging to the Gizenga forces has been meted out.

Soon the headlines swung back to Elisabethville. When Senator Dodd made an official visit there, two U. N. officers were beaten up during a cocktail party in the Senator's honor.

What actually happened has never appeared in the press. According to Senator Dodd's investigation, the U. N. procurator had informed the Katanga troops guarding the house of their general that U. N. agents intended to assassinate their superior. Shortly after the episode a U. N. officer was reported as saying, "I hope Senator Dodd (a friend of Katanga) will now realize what really goes on here."

Dodd had, however, further comment of what had happened.

The sad part of the Katanga story is that of blind leading of the U. N. policies of "strength to the weak and weakness to the strong" has hurt to the rank and file of our European allies. Katanga has become a forgotten episode of the era of peace. Our stand will not be forgotten. It has been the lowering of the curtain on this corner of the world.